Confusion.
Confusion n. The act or result of confusing; a
confused state.
Confuse 1. To
bring into disorder, to mix up. 2. To throw mind or feelings of (a person) into
disorder; to destroy the composure of. 3. To mix up in the mind, to fail to
distinguish between. 4. To make unclear.
(Dictionary 2001)
Confused adj. 1 Puzzled, perplexed, baffled,
mystified, bewildered. Opposite: Enlightened.
2 disordered, disorderly, muddled, mixed up, in disarray. Opposite: orderly.
Confusion n. 1 bewilderment, perplexity,
puzzlement, mystification, uncertainty, opposite:
understanding. 2 misperception, misunderstanding, mix up, muddle, mistake, opposite: clarity. 3 disorder, chaos,
rumoil, upheaval, commotion, opposite: order.
4 embarrassment, awkwardness, disorientation, uncertainty, self-consciousness, opposite: confidence.
(Thesaurus 2002)
Lazarus labelled both confusion and bewilderment as functional mental confusion. He says
‘…they are bound to have emotional correlates and consequences without being
emotions [themselves].’ (Lazarus 1991 Pg.83) This corresponds with the
dictionary definition that the state of confusion is a result of cognitive processes,
and suggests confusions relationship with emotion is that of a catalyst. Function
mental confusion must derive from thinking.
This is an important element of creating a convincing character performance.
There are other neurological conditions that recognise
confusion as a symptom. Senility, dementia and delirium are such examples.
Zarit & Zarit citing Lipowski (2011 Pg.72) lists other meanings, at least
medically, to the word confusion:
· -Disorientation
· -Inability to think clearly or coherently
· -Poor contact with reality
· - Reduced awareness of environment
Regarding delirium, Zarit & Zarit (2011 Pg.71) describes
its onset as ‘… [A] person who has been functioning adequately suddenly
develops global impairment in intellectual functioning.’ They goes onto say (2011
Pg.73) ‘Thinking is often characterised by a dreamlike quality with some
merging of dream content with reality.’ It’s important to remember that
confusion is a symptom of delirium and not the cause. There are other symptoms that
could be the driving force or instigator of confusion. Other symptoms include
delusions, hallucinations and illusions. As delirium is a driving force for
confusion, and confusion being a state rather than an emotion, an animator
might be inclined to borrow actions from other symptoms of delirium to portray
confusion, such as a series of gestures that make no readable, literal or
chronological sense (dream content with reality for instance). I would suggest
there is a risk of miss-communicating the action (thus narrative) to the
audience. Particularly when the other meanings listed above would appear to
have more substance. If we look at the types
of delirium it is possible to start to build possible characteristics to apply
to performance.
‘The types of performance have long been recognised
(Lipowski, 1990; Ross, Peyser, Shapio, & Folstien, 1991). The first type is
characterised by hyperalertness and hyperactivity; patients are restless,
agitated and vigilant. In contrast, the second involves hypoalertness and
hypoactivity. Patients are quiet and subdued and maybe drowsy. The third
pattern involves the fluctuations between the other two types … Patients have
difficulty focusing and sustaining or shifting attention.’ (Zarit & Zarit, 2011
Pg.73)
The issues for character performance arise when applying
these characteristics to characters that are naturally defined by them
(hyperactivity for example). However, with the symptoms physiological reactions
being at opposite extremes of considered normal reactionary behaviour speeds,
there appears to be an option to suit different character beats.
In science we can see examples of what drives confusion,
such as neurological conditions, but in storytelling terms, it is the narrative
itself that will drive the confusion. If we look into cognitive behaviours
rather than neurosis, such as irrationality in practical cognition, we can see an
example of what confusion drives, and gain a deeper understanding of where it
is situated in narrative character performance.
Irrationality
‘One way people
can behave irrationally is by being broken. If a person suffers a stroke, he
may behave irrationally. But this is not the kind of irrationality I am talking
about … So when I speak of irrationality in this paper, I am only concerned
with those varieties of irrationality that arise in intact cognizers.’ (Pollock
2006 Pg 4)
So confusion can drive irrationality, but irrationality is
not confined to confusion. The above quote is important because it suggests
that the initial driving force does not have to have a middleman. This exposes
a problem in storytelling; if irrational choices in performance arrive from an
un-established source we could potentially arrive at the same issue as
mentioned above, of miscommunication to the audience. We do not want to risk
the loss of believability.
To understand confusion in performance, we have to
understand the relationships of conditions and states as actions and reactions
to narrative objectives. By touching the surface of relationships in and around
confusion we can see an action and reactionary sequence. Delirium (action) can
cause (the reaction) confusion and confusion (itself an action) can drive irrationality
(also a reaction). If we replace delirium, with say a choice to either go left
or right as a road splits (action), and irrationality with a decisive choice
(reaction), confusion then, still the central component (action and reaction –
the act or result) is thinking. So if
a character does not think he cannot be confused.
Definition (So Far):
Confusion is
the process of thinking. Other aspects such as how and why are reliant on the
narrative. Exploring whether real-life physiological reactions or narrative subtext will be more efficient in conveying narrative will be fertile ground.
I will be exploring the non-verbal non-expression performance first.
References
DICTIONARY, 2001. The
Oxford Popular English Dictionary. Bath: Parragon.
LAZARUS, R., 1991. Emotion
& Adaption. New York: Oxford University.
POLLOCK, J., 2006. Irrationality
and Cognition. University of Arizona.
THEASAURUS, 2002. Encarta
Essential Thesaurus. London: Bloomsbury.
ZARIT, J. & ZARIT, S., 1991. Mental Disorders in Older Adults: Fundamentals of Assessment and
Treatment. 2nd ed. New York: Gilford Press.
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